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Draft Convention on Guaranty Letters
A major development in the law governing international independent guaran-
tees and stand-by letters of credit will take place during the 1995 session of the
United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL). At that
session the UNCITRAL is expected to consider and adopt the draft Convention
on International Guaranty Letters.1 This article gives the status of preparation of
the draft convention as of August 1, 1993.2
*Pace University. Professor Bergsten was Secretary of the United Nations Commission on Interna-
tional Trade Law from 1985 to 1991. He wishes to thank Mr. Gerold Herrmann, the current Secretary
of the Commission, for his comments on a draft of this article. It goes without saying that the views
expressed and the remaining errors are those of Professor Bergsten alone.
1. This is the current working title of the draft convention. U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/372, 21 (1993).
For the use of the term "guaranty letter," see infra note 20.
2. At the time this article went to press, one further session of the Working Group preparing
the draft convention was scheduled to take place in Fall 1993 and another is anticipated in Spring
1994. Following completion of the draft by the Working Group, it will be sent to all states for comment
prior to its submission to the 1995 session of the UNCITRAL. If the final text remains in the form
of a draft convention, the UNCITRAL will probably submit it to the General Assembly with the
suggestion that it be submitted to a diplomatic conference to be held in early 1997. A first draft of
articles 1 to 7 prepared by the Secretariat was contained in U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/WG.I/WP.67 (1990).
A redraft of articles 1 to 7 and the first draft of the remainder of the convention prepared by the
Secretariat were contained in U.N. Docs. A/CN.9/WG.II/WP.73 and Add.1 (1991). Following
discussion of the first draft in two sessions of the Working Group, the Secretariat prepared a second
draft, which was submitted to the eighteenth session of the Working Group in U.N. Does. A/CN.9/
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I. Background to the Convention
Independent guarantees and stand-by letters of credit serve the same economic
function. The guarantor, or issuer of the stand-by credit, promises to pay the
beneficiary a certain sum of money because of the failure of the account party to
pay or to perform some other obligation. Independent guarantees and stand-by
letters of credit are distinguished from the familiar suretyship in that the benefi-
ciary need not demonstrate the account party's failure; the beneficiary has the
right to payment either upon simple demand without justification or upon demand
accompanied by one or more specified documents. A required document might
be a statement of the beneficiary itself that the account party has failed in its
obligation or it might be a statement of a third party as to that failure. In either
case the guarantor or issuer of the credit is not interested in the performance or
failure to perform; it acts upon receipt of the simple demand, or of the demand
and appropriate documents, as the case may be. Although the processing of an
independent guarantee or a stand-by letter of credit is identical to that of a commer-
cial documentary letter of credit, the economic function is quite different. The
documentary letter of credit serves as a means of payment to the beneficiary when
the underlying transaction is properly performed; the independent guarantee and
the stand-by letter of credit serve as a means of payment to the beneficiary when
the underlying transaction is not properly performed.3
The decision to prepare the convention is closely associated with the UNCIT-
RAL's long-standing involvement in the work of the International Chamber of
Commerce (ICC) on the subjects of documentary credits and of guarantees. In
conformity with its charge to coordinate the work of other organizations active
in the field of international trade law,4 the UNCITRAL discussed developments
in documentary credits and guarantees regularly from 1968 to 1977. 5 In 1969 the
UNCITRAL recommended the use of the then current 1962 version of the Uniform
Customs and Practice for Documentary Credits (UCP), which had been prepared
by the ICC. 6 The UNCITRAL actively collaborated with the ICC in the 1974
WG.II/WP.76 and Add. 1 (1992). Additional Secretariat reports are contained in U.N. Docs. A/CN.9/
301; A/CN.9/WG.II/WP.65; A/CN.9/WG.II/WP.68 (1990); A/CN.9/WG.II/WP.70 (1991); and A/
CN.9/WG.lI/WP.71. Reports of the twelfth through nineteenth sessions of the Working Group (the
meetings at which the preparation of the convention has been discussed) are contained in U.N. Docs.
A/CN.9/316 (1988); A/CN.9/330 (1990); A/CN.9/342 (1990); A/CN.9/345 (1991); A/CN.9/358
(1992); A/CN.9/361 (1991); A/CN.9/372 (1993); A/CN.91374 and Corr. 1 (1993).
3. See infra text accompanying notes 26-30.
4. G.A. Res. 2205, pt. 2, 1 8, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/6316
(1966).
5. Both subjects were placed on the program of work in Report of the U.N. Commission on
International Trade Law on the Work of its First Session, U.N. GAOR, 23d Sess., Supp. No. 16,
48, U.N. Doc. A/7216 (1968) [hereinafter Report, First Session]. Discussion by the Commission
is contained in each of the annual reports through 1977.
6. Report ofthe U.N. Commission on International Trade Law on the Work ofits Second Session,
U.N. GAOR, 24th Sess., Supp. No. 18, 1 95, Doc. A/7618 (1969) [hereinafter Report, Second
Session].
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revision of the UCP and, after the ICC adopted the revision, the UNCITRAL
recommended its use.7 In view of the evident success of the UCP, the UNCITRAL
encouraged the ICC to undertake the preparation of an equivalent set of rules to
govern guarantees. 8 However, when the ICC adopted the Uniform Rules on
Contract Guarantees (URCG) in 1978, it did not request the UNCITRAL to
recommend their use, and the UNCITRAL did not do so on its own initiative. 9
The UCP was again before the UNCITRAL in 1982 when that organization
discussed the status of preparation in the ICC of what became the 1983 version
of the UCP. The new version was expected to provide that the UCP applied to
stand-by credits.'0 During the discussion in the UNCITRAL:
A proposal was made that the Secretariat should be requested to make a study of the
use of letters of credit, especially for purposes other than the sale of goods, to see
whether the current law was adequate. It was pointed out that letters of credit were
originally intended to be used in connexion with the documentary sale of goods. Cur-
rently they are used for a number of other purposes, such as in connexion with bid bonds
and re-purchase agreements. It was suggested that the legal rules developed for the one
7. Report of the U.N. Commission on International Trade Law on the Work of its Eighth Session,
U.N. GAOR, 30th Sess., Supp. No. 17, 41, U.N. Doc. A/10017 (1975) [hereinafter Report, Eighth
Session]; see also U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/101/Add. 1 (1975) for an analysis of the 1974 version of the
UCP in light of the comments that had been received by the UNCITRAL, largely from Eastern Europe
and developing countries. The replies were in response to a questionnaire, originally prepared by the
ICC for its national committees, that had been sent by the UNCITRAL to all states at the request of
the ICC.
8. See Report of the U.N. Commission on International Trade Law on the Work of its Third
Session, U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 17, 130-38, U.N. Doc. A/8017 (1970) [hereinafter
Report, Third Session]; Report, Eighth Session, supra note 7, 42-46.
9. The ICC Publication No. 325. Although it is not in the record, the reason why the URCG
was not submitted to the UNCITRAL for its endorsement was that the URCG did not admit the
possibility of simple demand guarantees (i.e., guarantees payable upon the simple demand of the
beneficiary without justification) whether documentary or otherwise. Simple demand guarantees are
also referred to as first demand guarantees. See infra text accompanying notes 43-50. Since the
UNCITRAL Secretariat was not satisfied that the URCG met the needs of international commerce
as it had evolved, the distinct possibility existed that the UNCITRAL would reject the request for
endorsement if it were made, a situation that would have been embarrassing for all concerned. The
URCG is rarely referred to in international contracts. Lars A.E. Hjerner, Contract Guarantees, in
INTERNATIONAL CONTRACTS AND PAYMENTS 77-78 (P. Sardevid & P. Volken eds., 1991). Neverthe-
less, since it is used by some banks, particularly in Scandinavia, when the ICC adopted the Uniform
Rules for Demand Guarantees (URDG) in December 1991, it said that the URCG "will continue to
be available for the time being for those who wish to use it and its future will be reviewed at a later
date in the light of experience of the new Rules." Foreword, Uniform Rules for Demand Guarantees
(URDG), ICC Publication No. 458, at 2. See infra note 13.
10. The Secretariat report to the UNCITRAL discussed this likelihood. U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/229,
12 (1989). Although article 1 of the 1983 version of the UCP provides that the UCP applies to
stand-by letters of credit "to the extent which they may be applicable," there is no explicit indication
as to which substantive articles are applicable to stand-bys. This problem remains in the newest
revision of the UCP, which has been published as ICC Publication No. 500, with an effective date
of January 1, 1994. For example, the comment to what was then draft article 1 states that "the majority
of the articles do not apply to the standby credit" with no indication as to which articles are applicable.
ICC Document No. 470-37/104 (Sept. 18, 1992).
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situation might not be appropriate for these other uses to which letters of credit are
currently put."1
By the time the report containing the requested study was submitted to the
UNCITRAL in 1988, the ICC had prepared a draft of a new set of rules for
independent guarantees that were intended to substitute for, or to supplement, the
1978 URCG. The existence of a draft of new ICC rules that promised to be of
use with independent guarantees was of direct relevance to the recommendation
contained in the UNCITRAL Secretariat's report since, as therein pointed out,
"[b]y its function and purpose, the stand-by letter of credit differs considerably
from the traditional commercial letter of credit or documentary credit and is
equivalent to independent bank guarantees and similar indemnities." 12 Thus, any
work by the UNCITRAL could duplicate the project already well underway in
the ICC in respect of independent guarantees.
As a result, the Secretariat suggested, and the UNCITRAL agreed, that a
session of an UNCITRAL Working Group should be devoted to consideration of,
and comment on, the then existing draft of the ICC Rules. "This would allow
the Commission, with its balanced representation of all regions and the various
economic and legal systems, to assess the world-wide acceptability of the draft
Rules." 3 In addition to considering the draft ICC Rules, which were of a contrac-
tual nature, the Working Group was requested to consider whether the UNCIT-
RAL should prepare a uniform law on the subject. "4 The Working Group made
such a recommendation, and the UNCITRAL adopted it. 5
11. Report on the U.N. Commission on International Trade Law on the Work of its Fifteenth
Session, U.N. GAOR, 37th Sess., Supp. No. 17, 1 109, U.N. Doc. A/37/17 (1982). The representa-
tive of the ICC stated that his organization looked forward to cooperating in the preparation of the
study. Id. I 111. Two years later the UNCITRAL "[c]ommend[ed] the use of the 1983 revision [of
the UCP], as from 1 October 1984, in transactions involving the establishment of a documentary
credit." Report of the U.N. Commission on International Trade Law on the Work of its Seventeenth
Session, U.N. GAOR, 39th Sess., Supp. No. 17, 1 129, U.N. Doc. A/39/17, (1984).
12. U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/301, 1 91.
13. Id. 1 94. The action of the UNCITRAL is found in Report of the U.N. Commission on
International Trade Law on the Work of its Twenty-First Session, U.N. GAOR, 43rd Sess., Supp.
No. 17, 19, U.N. Doc. A/43/17, (1988) [hereinafter Report, Twenty-First Session]. The Working
Group's comments on the draft URDG are found in U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/316, 1112-121. The ICC
adopted the URDG on December 3, 1991. For a discussion of the URDG, see Michael Vasseur, The
New Rules of the International Chamber of Commerce for "Guarantees on Demand", 1992 INT'L
Bus. L.J. 239; Roy Goode, The New L C.C. Uniform Rules for Demand Guarantees, 1992 LLOYD'S
MAR. & COM. L.Q. 190; and, in respect of an earlier draft, Boris Kozolchyk, Bank Guarantees and
Letters of Credit: Timefora Return to the Fold, 11 U. PA. J. INT'L Bus. L. 1, 58-67 (1989). Following
adoption of the URDG, the ICC undertook the preparation of a new set of rules on accessory (suretyship
type) guarantees for use primarily by insurance companies, entitled Uniform Rules for Contract
Bonds. The most recent draft is in ICC Document No. 470/685 (Oct. 12, 1992). The Rules were
submitted to the ICC Counc'l for adoption in April 1993.
14. Report, Twenty-First Session, supra note 13, 11 23-26.
15. U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/316, 11122-23; Report of the U.N. Commission on International Trade
Law on the Work of its Twenty-Second Session, U.N. GAOR, 44th Sess., Supp. No. 17, 1 244, U.N.
Doc. A/44/17 (1989). In this context the term "uniform law" referred to any of the various techniques
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II. Internationality
When the Working Group made the recommendation that a convention should
be prepared, it said that the convention "should be limited to international instru-
ments, in particular, since inclusion of domestic instruments would adversely
affect the world-wide acceptability of the [convention]."- 16 According to draft
article 4(1), "[a] guaranty letter is international if the places of business specified
in the guaranty letter of any two of the following persons are in different States:
issuer, beneficiary, principal, instructing party [, advisor] or confirmer."
17
More recently, sentiment for including domestic transactions has increased. As
a consequence, the parties to a guaranty letter that is not international will be
permitted to choose to have the convention apply to it by simply stating that the
letter is subject to the convention."
I. Application of the Convention to Independent Guarantees and
Stand-by Letters of Credit
At its first meeting on the preparation of the convention, the Working Group
decided that the convention should "focus on independent guarantees, including
stand-by letters of credit. "'9 In the draft convention both types of instrument are
characterized as a "guaranty letter.""
available to the international community to unify the law. Subsequently, the Working Group decided
to proceed on the working assumption that the final text would take the form of a convention without
thereby precluding the possibility of reverting to the more flexible form of a model law at the final
stage of the work when the Working Group would have a clear picture as to the provisions included
in the draft text. U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/361, 1 147, reaffirmed, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/372, 1 16. Through-
out the remainder of this article the text under preparation will be referred to as the convention.
16. U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/316, 1 172.
17. Id.
18. U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/372, 1 68-72.
19. U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/330, 113. The Working Group went on to say that the convention could
also "be extended to traditional commercial letters of credit where that would be useful in view of
their independent nature and the need [to regulate] equally relevant issues." At a subsequent session
it "decided to consider at a later stage the question of the inclusion of commercial letters of credit"
in the convention. U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/358, 1 45. The Working Group has not yet considered the
question. For a strong argument that documentary credits should be included, see James E. Byrne,
Fundamental Issues in the Unification and Harmonization of Letter of Credit Law, 37 Lov. L. REv.
1, 17-18 (1991).
20. "Guaranty letter" has been used by the Working Group as the generic term to cover both
the stand-by letter of credit and the independent guarantee. The Working Group was in agreement
at its eighteenth session that, if the current approach of largely common provisions was retained, the
use of one expression was useful from a drafting point of view. If, however, bank guarantees and
stand-by letters of credit are dealt with in separate parts of the convention, as suggested by the United
States, infra note 36, there would be little need for a common expression. U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/372,
11 20-21. Therefore, the terminological issue could not be decided until the substantive issue was
decided. The delegation of the United States has suggested that, if a generic term is used, it should
be "independent undertaking[]" on the grounds that it "is better balanced than 'guaranty letter' (or
any other term that uses the word 'guarantee')." U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/WG.I/WP.77, ch. 1, art. 1,
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The decision to treat independent guarantees and stand-by letters of credit as
equivalent legal instruments is in sharp contrast to the decision of the ICC that
stand-by letters of credit should continue to be governed by the UCP rather than by
the new URDG. The official ICC explanation for treating them separately is that:
Standby credits are already governed by [the UCP]. They have developed into all-purpose
financial support instruments which are used in a much wider range of financial and com-
mercial activity than demand guarantees, and regularly involve practices and procedures
(e.g. confirmation, issue for a bank's own account, presentation of documents to a party
other than the issuer) that are infrequently encountered in relation to demand guarantees
and that ally standby credits more closely with documentary credits. Accordingly, while
standby credits are technically within the definition of a demand guarantee, it is expected
that issuers of standby credits will continue to use the UCP, which are both more detailed
and more appropriate to the particular requirements of standby credits.2'
On its face the decision to treat independent guarantees and stand-by letters of
credit together also appears to be inconsistent with current American law. The
apparent inconsistency may be explained, at least in part, by the fact that American
practice does not use the concept of an independent contractual guarantee.22 Once
observers take this into account, the apparent inconsistency is less sharp.23
The United States, as elsewhere, has traditionally known two forms of promise
to pay that are independent of the underlying transaction that gave rise to the prom-
ise. The first, of ancient origin, is the negotiable instrument, where the promise to
pay becomes truly independent when the instrument comes into the hands of a
holder in due course. 24 The second, of more recent origin, is the letter of credit, by
cmt. 4 (1992). See also article 2 of the current text of the draft convention, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/
WG.II/WP.76, which describes a guaranty letter as an independent undertaking. But see Kozolchyk,
supra note 13, at 69: "[A] term such as 'guarantee letter of credit' may well solve the nomenclature
dispute between European and American bankers and banking lawyers."
21. Uniform Rules for Demand Guarantees, Introduction, ICC Publication No. 458, at 4.
22. However, as noted in RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF SECURITY § 117 cmt. d (1941):
The surety, if he desires, may assume a risk greater than that which would be implied from a mere guaranteeing
of the principal's performance. The surety may contract not only as a surety but also as an insurer, that is, that
he will indemnify the creditor against loss, irrespective of the continuance or even of the existence of a duty on
the part of the principal.
Section 3(2) of the current draft of the Restatement of Suretyship provides that it does not apply
to stand-by letters of credit. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF SURETYSHIP § 3(2) (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1992).
Comment c to draft section 3 notes that "demand guarantees" and "international bank guarantees,"
which have often been treated by American courts as though they were letters of credit governed by
letter of credit law, are also outside the scope of the Restatement. Id. cmt. c. Comment b suggests
that in cases where the law governing letters of credit does not give a solution, the Restatement might
be looked to for guidance. Id. cmt. b.
23. Comment Ito the proposed redraft of U.C.C. § 5-103 notes the similarity between a guarantee
and a letter of credit. However, "[tihis [Article] does not apply to guarantees and it is important that
courts recognize the distinction between letters of credit and guarantees." U.C.C. § 5-103 cmt. 1 (Mar.
31, 1993, Draft) [hereinafter Mar. 31, 1993, Draft]. The comment goes on to describe guarantees in
suretyship terms. Comment 3 states:
[tio say that something is a "guarantee" in the typical domestic transaction is to say that the parties intend that
particular legal rules apply to it. By acknowledging that something is a guarantee, but asserting that it is to be treated
as a "letter of credit," the parties leave a court uncertain about where the rules on guarantees st op and those
concerning letters of credit begin.
Id. cmt. 3 (emphasis added).
24. U.C.C. § 3-305 (1989).
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which an issuer promises to pay the beneficiary upon demand (clean credit) or when
the beneficiary presents to it the documents called for in the letter of credit.
Generally speaking, all other categories of promisor are able to raise various
defenses against the promisee, or against a transferee of the promisee's rights. In
particular, a guarantor, or surety, can raise most defenses against the beneficiary
that would be available to the party for whose promise the guarantor stands respon-
sible.
Following World War H a new form of guarantee was needed in which the
promise of the guarantor to pay the beneficiary was independent of the underlying
transaction. As with the commercial letter of credit, the guarantor or issuer 26
would pay the beneficiary upon demand, or upon demand accompanied by speci-
fied documents. The innovation was that the documents would indicate that the
account party had failed to perform its obligations under the underlying transaction
rather than that the beneficiary had performed its obligations, as in the normal
letter of credit. The guarantor or issuer would have no duty in regard to the
underlying transaction; its duty would be limited to determining whether the
demand for payment and the required documents, if any, were in the proper form.
In the United States, and a few other countries, the independent guarantee that
was sought was furnished by adapting the traditional letter of credit to this new
and nontraditional context, calling the result a stand-by letter of credit.27 In most
other countries banks gave the desired guarantee in the form of an unconditional
contractual promise to pay upon demand or upon demand accompanied by docu-
ments. In many of those countries the issue of whether the courts would enforce
the promise as written, or whether the promise would be categorized as a familiar
suretyship type guarantee, was not clear for a period of time.28 By the late 1980s
25. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF SECURITY, supra note 22, §§ 117-118.
26. The Working Group decided that, subject to review by the drafting group that would be
established at a later session, it would retain both stand-by letter of credit and bank guarantee terminol-
ogy and that it would use the double expression "guarantor or issuer." U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/372,
38. For the Secretariat's recommendation to use the single term "issuer," see U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/
WG.II/WP.76, art. 2, remark 3.
27. The stand-by letter of credit was developed in the United States of America where the pledging of credit as surety
and the issuance of guarantees is beyond the powers of banks as defined in statutes, charters and case law.
... In other countries stand-by letters of credit are used, if at all, to a considerably lesser extent. Often the reason
for doing so is that the commercial or banking relationship at hand involves a United States party. In other contexts,
the reasons contributing to what appears to be an increasing use are probably to be found in the familiarity of
business and banking circles with the traditional letter of credit and their perception of its legal certainty as
compared with a possibly unsettled law on guarantees, in particular as regards the independence of the bank's
undertaking from the underlying transaction.
U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/301, 1 25-26.
28. "This form of bank obligation has long been in use in Germany and Switzerland but was
almost unknown in France or Belgium, where the suretyship (cautionnement) was used in similar
circumstances." Jean Stoufflet, Recent Developments in the Law of International Bank Guarantees
in France and Belgium, 4 ARIz. J. INT'L COMP. L. 48 (1987); see also Kozolchyk, supra note 13.
Statutory provisions recognizing independent guarantees from Bahrain, Czechoslovakia, Democratic
Yemen, German Democratic Republic (G.D.R.), Iraq, and Kuwait are set out and discussed in U.N.
Doc. A/CN.9IWG.II/WP.65, 11 14-18. The Czechoslovak and G.D.R. provisions were in their
international trade codes. That the other four countries were all beneficiary countries may be signifi-
cant.
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it was clear in most of the significant commercial states that the promises would
be enforced as written and that an independent guarantee existed in addition to
a suretyship type of guarantee. Although they were the fruit of freedom of con-
tract, in the fundamental case in the United Kingdom, independent guarantees,
labelled as performance bonds or performance guarantees, were said by the Court
of Appeal to be "virtually promissory notes payable on demand" and further-
more, "the performance guarantee stands on a similar footing to a letter of
credit." 2 9 The British courts were not the only ones to see the similarity between
independent guarantees and letters of credit. 0
Nevertheless, the question remains whether stand-by letters of credit and inde-
pendent guarantees should be treated as equivalent instruments to be governed by
the same legal text. 31 As pointed out by the ICC in the introduction to the URDG
and by the United States delegation in the UNCITRAL Working Group, there are
both historical differences in the development of the two instruments and some
technical differences in the procedures followed.32 Further, some observers have
argued that stand-by credits, but not independent guarantees, are often used to
secure financial obligations.33 However, that argument has been contested in the
Working Group, where it was reported that "bank guarantees were used, like
financial stand-by letters of credit, in financial markets. "' The delegation of the
United States has also
expressed the concern that the draft text disregarded the existing difference in terms of
firmness between stand-by letters of credit and European-style bank guarantees and that
it might be inappropriate to aim for a unitary set of rules that would do justice to neither
type of undertakings, for both of which there was a demand on the market. 31
As a result the U.S. delegation submitted a proposal to the eighteenth session of
the Working Group in which the two instruments would be treated in separate,
29. Edward Owen Eng, Ltd. v. Barclays Bank Int'l Ltd., [1978] 1 Q.B. 159, 170-71 (C.A.).
30. In its decision of November 14, 1989, reported in French translation, 1992 D. Somm. 236,
obs. Vasseur, the Supreme Court of Spain compared an independent guarantee to a documentary letter
of credit governed by the UCP. See also Byrne, supra note 19, at 17. United States courts have
characterized independent guarantees issued in foreign countries as stand-by letters of credit. Egyptian
Am. Bank, S.A.E. v. United States, 13 CI. Ct. 337 (1987), aff'd, 861 F.2d 728 (Fed. Cir. 1988);
American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Hamilton Indus. Int'l, Inc., 583 F. Supp. 164 (N.D. Ill. 1984),
rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Banque Paribas v. Hamilton Indus. Int'l, Inc., 767 F.2d 380 (7th
Cir. 1985).
31. See supra notes 23-24.
32. Uniform Rules for Demand Guarantees, supra text accompanying note 21; U.N. Doc. A/
CN.9/358, 1 14.
33. Uniform Rules for Demand Guarantees, supra text accompanying note 21; Kozolchyk, supra
note 13, at 19.
34. U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/361, 72. The statement in the Working Group did not make it clear
whether financial guarantees were issued only to single and exclusive beneficiaries or whether they
were also issued to multiple beneficiaries or to fiduciary representatives of multiple beneficiaries, as is
customarily done in the United States with financial standbys. See Kozolchyk, supra note 13, at 19.
35. U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/WP.IU/WP.77, 1.
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albeit parallel, parts of the convention.36 The fate of the proposal is yet to be
decided. On the basis of the discussion of the proposal in the Working Group,
this writer concludes that it is likely to be rejected. 37 However, the delegation of
the United States remains optimistic."
IV. Independence of the Guarantee: Simple Demand Guarantees and
Nondocumentary Conditions
The concern of the delegation of the United States as to the difference in the
firmness of stand-by letters of credit and European-style bank guarantees 39 brings
into question the extent to which such guarantees are independent of the underlying
transaction for which the guarantee has been issued. By definition a letter of credit
contains an independent promise of the issuer to pay under the conditions specified
in the credit. 40 A contractual guarantee, on the other hand, can be drafted with
an infinite range of possibilities between a fully independent promise and one in
which payment is conditioned on the issuer's determination that the principal
obligor has failed in its promised performance.41
36. Id. The proposal of the United States would divide the convention into three parts, the first
containing general provisions, the second and third containing provisions relating to independent
guarantees and stand-by letters of credit respectively.
37. U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/372, 105-110. The proposal was not explicitly considered at the
nineteenth session of the Working Group, but the question was raised on several occasions as to
whether the Convention should provide different rules on particular points for stand-by letters of credit
and for guarantees.
38. In a letter dated April 7, 1993, to the members and observers of the State Department Advisory
Committee on Private International Law, Mr. Harold S. Burman, Executive Director of the Advisory
Committee, stated that:
At the last meeting [of the Working Groupl, the U.S. delegation made headway on its proposal that a draft
convention be prepared in three parts;. . . . Such a convention, if it followed this general direction, would facilitate
the use of both types of instruments by providing for mutual recognition and enforcement, in accordance with rules
designed for each instrument. Thus, a bank guarantee issued in France would be entitled to enforcement in U.S.
courts in accordance with rules designed for guarantees, and vice-versa for a standby issued in the U.S. on which
enforcement is sought in another contracting State.. .. The U.S. has maintained throughout, while not being
opposed to a unitary set of international rules, that the deliberations in UNCITRAL demonstrated that a single set
of merged rules could notcover both types of instruments without compromising their intended commercial function,
and that the market place would be unlikely to accept such rules as a result. We believe many delegates now concur
with our assessment.
39. Supra note 35.
40. The statement in the text is conventional wisdom. However, U.C.C. § 5-103(1)(a) defines
a "credit" or "letter of credit" as "an engagement by a bank or other person made at the request
of a customer and of a kind within the scope of this Article (Section 5-102) that the issuer will honor
drafts or other demands for payment upon compliance with the conditions specified in the credit."
U.C.C. § 5-103(l)(a) (1989). Section 5-102(l)(c) in turn states that article 5 applies "to a credit issued
by a bank or other person if the credit is not [documentary] but conspicuously states that it is a letter
of credit or is conspicuously so entitled." U.C.C. § 5-102(l)(c) (1989). Although official comment
No. 1 indicates that the purpose of subsection (c) is to permit the issuance of "clean" credits under
article 5, the literal text of subsection (c) would also permit the issuance of a credit under article 5
that was conditional on an event other than demand or the presentation of specified documents. The
proposed redraft of article 5 would make it applicable only to documentary credits. Mar. 31, 1993,
Draft, supra note 23, §§ 5-102(a)(9), 5-103(a), and cmt. 6 to § 5-102.
41. For an argument that European independent guarantees are consistently less independent than
stand-by letters of credit, see generally Kozolchyk, supra note 13. In IE Contractors Ltd v. Lloyds
Bank & Rafidain Bank, [1989] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 205 (Eng. Q.B.), the principal successfully contested
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As a practical matter the independence of the guarantee is closely related to the
requirement that the demand for payment be documentary in nature. The bank
then would need to establish only that the "documents. . . appear on their face
to be in accordance with the terms and conditions" of the guaranty letter without
concern as to whether the documents accurately reflect the beneficiary's right to
demand payment. 42 The extent to which documents may be required arises in two
contexts, simple demand guarantees and nondocumentary conditions.
A. SIMPLE DEMAND GUARANTEES
One of the primary battlegrounds on which the development of independent
guarantees has been fought is the simple demand guarantee. In its truly simplest
form, the simple demand guarantee authorizes the beneficiary to make demand
for payment in any form, including oral, and at any time within the period of
effectiveness of the guarantee without justifying the legitimacy of the demand.
The possibilities for an improper demand by the beneficiary are obvious, however
seldom such demands may occur in practice.4 3 The possibilities for improper
demand do not change by requiring the demand to be made in the form of a draft
drawn on the issuer or in other written form, even though it has been said in the
Working Group that such a demand is documentary in form. 44
One of the purposes of the 1978 URCG was to limit the possibility of improper
demand of a guarantee issued under it. According to article 9 of the URCG, if
the guarantee did not specify the documentation to be produced in support of a
claim or merely specified the submission of a statement of claim, the beneficiary
was required to submit (a) in the case of a tender guarantee, the beneficiary's
declaration that the guarantee was due and an agreement to have any dispute
the debiting of its account by the counter-guarantor on the grounds that the demand by the beneficiary
of the indirect guarantee "neither assert[ed] unequivocally a claim for damages owing to the benefi-
ciary by GKN under the construction contracts, nor assert[ed] that the amount of damages so sustained
was at least equal to the amount of the indemnity afforded by each of the [guarantees]." Id. at 210.
In light of the decision in the case one commentator stated that "a bank should ensure that performance
bonds and counter-guarantees are as unconditional as possible." Paul Howcroft, Performance Bonds-
the Tide Turns against the Banks, 1990 J. INT'L BANKING L. 17, 23.
42. Cf. UCP art. 15.
43. Hans Giger, Problems of Bank Guarantee Abuse in Swiss Law, 4 ARiz. J. INT'L COMP. L.
38, 40 n. 15 (1987), states that one estimate of the frequency of conflict associated with guarantees used
in foreign trade was 0.1 % (citing F. VON WESTPHALEN, DIE BANKGARANTIE IM INTERNATIONALEN
HANDELSVERKEHR 155 (1982)).
44. U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/330, 69. The statement in the Working Group that stand-by letters of
credit are invariably documentary, U.N. Doc. AICN.9/358, 1 21, contemplates treating a draft or
written demand for payment as a document. That would be consistent with the definition of "docu-
ment" in draft revised U.C.C. § 5-102(6), which provides that a document includes "a draft or other
demand." Mar. 31, 1993, Draft, supra note 23, § 5-102(6). In its eighteenth session the Working
Group received, but did not discuss, a suggestion "to include within the definition of 'document' bills
of exchange, promissory notes and demands for payment so as to avoid any uncertainty as to the
applicability of the Convention to clean stand-by letters of credit and simple demand guarantees."
U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/372, 100.
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with the principal submitted to litigation or arbitration, and (b) in the case of a
performance guarantee or of a repayment guarantee, either a court decision or an
arbitral award justifying the claim, or the approval of the principal in writing to
the claim and to the amount to be paid. 5 In addition to limiting the possibility of
improper demand, those requirements effectively eliminated the simple demand
guarantee.4
Article 20 of the 1991 URDG does not go so far. It requires only that the
demand be in writing and supported by a written statement that the principal is
in breach of the underlying contract and in what respect the principal is in breach.
The simple demand guarantee is thereby transformed into a documentary guaran-
tee, with a required minimum content of the document.
Neither approach has been favored in the UNCITRAL Working Group. When
the Working Group considered the draft URDG,
doubts were expressed as to whether a legal provision of the nature of article 20 could
in fact discourage or encourage the use of a certain type of guarantee. Even if it had
such potential, it was doubted whether a provision of contractual rules should be used
for that purpose. Irrespective of the frequency with which this type of guarantee was
used, it was submitted that a legal rule should take into account, and provide certainty
for, all types of guarantees in use and leave the choice of the type of guarantee to be
used to the credit decisions of the parties involved.4 7
The UNCITRAL Secretariat sought to satisfy the concerns by proposing that
the draft convention provide: "If no statement or document is required, the
beneficiary, when demanding payment, is deemed to impliedly certify that pay-
ment is due." 4 Therefore, no document certifying to the propriety of the demand
for payment would be required in the case of a simple demand guarantee or clean
stand-by letter of credit. The Working Group was divided when it considered the
proposal. Some thought that the convention should focus on guaranty letters
payable upon presentation of documents in connection with the nonperformance
of the underlying commercial obligation. That group favored a provision similar
to article 20 of the URDG. 49 The majority in the Working Group, however,
favored the suggested provision for the reasons previously given in regard to
article 20 of the URDG. 5°
There would seem to be two differences between requiring a written statement
that payment was due and a legal presumption to the same effect. One difference
45. ICC Publication No. 325.
46. Article 9 caused some confusion since, "if the Rules ... [are incorporated into] an on-demand
guarantee, in order to be effective 'on demand' the guarantee must explicitly exclude Article 9 or state
that the requirements for documentation ... do not apply." Hjerner, supra note 9, at 76.
47. U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/316, 89.
48. U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/WG.II/WP.73, art. 14.
49. U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/361, 20.
50. Id. 21-22. At the nineteenth session the Working Group decided that the words "payment
is due" should be replaced by a mention that the demand was not in bad faith or otherwise improper.
U.N. Docs. A/CN.9/374, 85 and A/CN.9/374/Corr. 1.
WINTER 1993
870 THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
is psychological: most people find it more difficult to lie overtly than to allow the
same lie to arise out of a presumption of law. The other difference is legal: proving
that the beneficiary had acted fraudulently would be easier if a false written
statement had been made that payment under the guaranty letter was due than if
only a simple demand for payment had been made.
B. NONDOCUMENTARY CONDITIONS
The problems arising out of conditions to payment not represented by a docu-
ment have been more difficult for the Working Group to solve. The Working
Group found that there was a wide range of nondocumentary conditions.
One category related to the establishment of the guarantee. For example, the establish-
ment of a substitute guarantee might be conditioned on the return of the original guarantee
instrument. A second category concerned pre-conditions for the effectiveness of the
undertaking, for example, in an advance payment guarantee, that the advance payment
had been made. A third category encompassed conditions in connection with the demand
for payment that were mentioned in a guarantee without a stipulation as to how the
fulfillment of the condition was to be evidenced. For example, a tender guarantee might
be conditioned on the fact that the contract had been awarded, or a guarantee might state
that payment was due if a certain event occurred that was or was not stated to be linked
to an underlying transaction, or a counter-guaranty might be payable when the ultimate
beneficiary demands payment from the beneficiary of the counter-guaranty. A fourth
category concerned increases and reductions in the guarantee amount. For example, a
guarantee might provide that the amount was to be increased in accordance with the
opening of letters of credit by an importer or as the volume of goods delivered increased.
Such automatic provisions were also associated with the reduction of the guarantee
amount, for example, as deliveries or works progressed. A final category of nondocu-
mentary conditions had to do with expiry clauses. For example, a guarantee might make
reference to the completion of works or deliveries as the point of expiry. It was pointed
out that such indefinite expiry terms were often accompanied by fixed, ultimate expiry
dates. "
It would seem that all of the nondocumentary conditions mentioned in regard
to guarantees could also apply to stand-by letters of credit. 2 Observers could, of
course, question whether some of those nondocumentary conditions that rely on
knowledge within the purview of the issuer are really conditions. 3 Clearly, many
of the delegates to the Working Group were of the view that they were conditions.
Moreover, at the stage of drafting an international text that will eventually be
51. U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/358, 57.
52. A separate list of nondocumentary conditions often found in stand-by letters of credit was
given in id. 58. The list was essentially a shortened version of the list of nondocumentary conditions
found in guarantees.
53. Byrne, supra note 19, at 35-36, says that "events whose control is not exclusive to the party
charged with performance but involve, in a sense, joint or coordinated performance with the obligor
on the credit ... are not true conditions." By way of example he cites "the prepayment of a sum
of money to the bank (but only to the bank) as a precondition to the establishment of the credit." Id.
at 36.
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adopted in six official languages and will be interpreted in a large number of legal
systems, it is safer to assume that an apparent nondocumentary condition is truly
a condition even if it poses no problems of fact finding for the issuer. The text
can then specify how such nondocumentary conditions should be treated.
The Secretariat's suggested solution to the problem was to specify that a guar-
anty letter was independent if it "contains [as its heading and] within its text the
words 'Stand-by letter of credit' or 'Demand guarantee'."' The Secretariat's
proposal would have required that a demand for payment under such a guaranty
letter be accompanied by the type of document required by article 20 of the
URDG. 55 The Working Group rejected the suggestion and requested the Secretar-
iat to prepare a text based upon a proposal of the United States, which read as
follows:
An undertaking is independent in that the issuer's performance to the beneficiary is not
subject to or qualified by the existence or validity of an underlying transaction or of any
terms other than those appearing in the undertaking or any condition, act or event other
than presentation of stipulated documents. 56
However, almost immediately after the Working Group decided to adopt the
proposal of the United States, the statement was made that
it was not justified to frustrate the intention of the parties by disregarding a non-
documentary condition or by requiring that the fulfillment of the condition be certified
by the beneficiary. It was pointed out that in practice non-documentary conditions might
be within or without the operational purview of the issuer. Some proponents of that view
considered that certain less important non-documentary conditions might be disregarded
or treated as documentary ones .... 57
The final word on this issue has not yet been spoken.
V. Improper Demand
A. CRITERIA
A strict interpretation of the rule that the guarantee is independent of the
underlying transaction would lead to the conclusion that neither fraud nor manifest
abuse of rights by the beneficiary would constitute an objection to payment. 8
54. U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/WG.IIiWP.76, at 5. The proposed wording was basically the same as
current U.C.C. § 5-103(1)(c) (1989).
55. U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/WG.II/WP.76, at 6. As indicated in the text supra at notes 49-51, in
contrast to URDG art. 20, no document would be required in the case of a simple demand guarantee.
56. U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/372, 59, 62.
57. Id. 65. Section 5-110(d) of the Mar. 31, 1993, Draft of revised article 5, supra note 23,
provides, "[ilf, despite the presence of non-documentary conditions, an engagement constitutes a
letter of credit under Section 5-102(a)(9), an issuer shall disregard the non-documentary conditions
and treat them as if they were not stated."
58. U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/358, 49. Similarly, illegality of the underlying transaction or violation
of public policy would have no effect on the issuer's payment obligation. Id.
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However, the nonfulfillment of the principal's obligation is the very contingency
against which the beneficiary was intended to be secured. 59 Even in the case of
a simple demand guarantee, the beneficiary can properly demand payment only
if the principal is in default on the underlying transaction; any other demand would
be improper.6
The discussion in the Working Group as to what would constitute an improper
demand has been particularly confusing, in part because the participants have
suggested criteria that came from their national judicial experience. The terms
"fraud" and "abuse of right" have been avoided, since they already have well-
developed (and inconsistent) meanings in various legal systems. 6' The difficulties
are accentuated by the fact that the standards to be articulated are inherently vague
and are to be applied in a wide variety of circumstances.
The only substantive grounds for calling a demand improper on which there
has been general agreement is that the documents were forged. 62 In regard to
documents that contained false or inaccurate information, there was substantial
sentiment that the demand would be improper only if the beneficiary had been
aware of the inaccuracy at the time of making the demand, but no final decision
has been made.63 Of the other possible grounds suggested for considering the
demand to be improper, the two that received the most vocal support were that the
beneficiary prevented performance of the obligations in the underlying transaction
that were secured by the guaranty letter and that the amount claimed by the
beneficiary under the guaranty letter was disproportionate to the damage suf-
fered. 64 However, while both might well be considered to be an improper demand
in the abstract, they often call for refined determinations in regard to the underly-
ing transaction, determinations that all agreed should not be thrust upon the issuer.
Article 19 of the second draft prepared by the Secretariat, which has not yet
been discussed by the Working Group, sets out three substantive grounds for
finding a demand to be improper:
(a) [the beneficiary knows that] any document is forged;
(b) the beneficiary knows or cannot be unaware that no payment is due [on the
basis asserted in the demand and supporting documents]; or
59. Id. 151.
60. See text supra at notes 45-51. At the eighteenth session a proposal was made and rejected
that the definition of "guaranty letter" should include the purpose for which the undertaking was
given as an essential characteristic of the undertakings to be covered. U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/372,
1 28-34. The deemed certification that payment is due contained in article 14 does not, of course,
preclude the possibility that the demand for payment is improper.
61. U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/361, 1177, 80. The concept of fraud is often influenced by criminal law
notions. U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/345, 1 40.
62. U.N. Doc. AICN.9/345, 1 82.
63. Id.
64. Id. 11 86-87. Sometimes a proposal does not receive vocal support in a meeting because all
participants support it. That may be why there were no comments on the proposal that a demand for
payment of a repayment guaranty letter would be improper if no advance payment had been made.
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(c) judging by the type and purpose of the guaranty letter, the demand has no
conceivable basis.65
Further refinement is offered in the following paragraph of article 19 as to
situations in which "the demand has no conceivable basis."
Improper demand under a counter-guaranty letter raises somewhat different
problems. It is possible for the impropriety to arise under the counter-guaranty
itself, such as when a demand for payment under the counter-guaranty letter is
made although no demand had been made under the indirect guaranty letter.6 The
more typical, and more difficult, case is when payment under the indirect guaranty
letter took place, but the payment was tainted with fraud of the ultimate benefi-
ciary .67 The question that has not yet been settled is the extent to which the
beneficiary of the counter-guaranty letter, that is, the issuer of the indirect guar-
anty letter, must have been involved in, or be aware of, the fraud of the ultimate
beneficiary. 68 The Secretariat's second draft provides that a demand would be
improper if:
In the case of a counter-guaranty letter, the beneficiary has not received a demand for
payment under the guaranty letter issued by it, or the beneficiary has paid upon such
a demand although it was obliged [under the law applicable to its guaranty letter] to
reject the demand [as lacking conformity or as being improper].l
B. REJECTION BY THE ISSUER
The Working Group recognizes that, in accord with practice in regard to both
stand-by letters of credit and independent guarantees, the issuer has a restricted
role in determining whether a demand is improper. The issuer must, of course,
review the documents presented by the beneficiary to determine that they are
genuine and consistent with the documents called for in the guaranty letter. In that
regard the Working Group decided to adopt the two-pronged approach that is also
used in article 13 of UCP 500. The issuer is held to a standard of good faith
and reasonable care in examining the documents for discrepancies; to determine
whether minor discrepancies should result in rejection of the documents, "the
issuer shall have due regard to the applicable standard of international guarantee
or stand-by letter of credit practice." 7 ° The Working Group also decided that,
where a demand was neither improper nor in conformity with the terms and conditions
of the guaranty letter, the issuer would be free to exercise its discretion in deciding
whether to pay or not. However, where the issuer chose to pay upon such a demand,
payment should not prejudice the rights of the principal.7'
65. U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/WG.Il/WP.76/Add.1, art. 19.
66. U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/361, 1 89. The indirect guaranty letter is the guaranty letter issued by
a bank, normally in the beneficiary's country, in favor of the beneficiary.
67. Id.
68. Id. 1 89-90.
69. U.N. Doe. A/CN.9/WG.II/WP.76/Add.1, art. 19(2)(e), variant Y.
70. U.N. Do. A/CN.9/374, 11 93-95, 99.
71. Id. 1 107.
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This two-pronged approach may usefully be compared to the approach taken in
the current version of revised U.C.C. section 5-110(C). 72 In regard to improper
demands for payment the Working Group has agreed that where the fraud or
abuse in the demand for payment is blatant, and could be perceived by anyone,
the issuer will be obligated to refuse payment.73
C. INJUNCTIONS AGAINST PAYMENT
Many countries, including the United States, authorize the courts to grant an
order enjoining the issuer from paying or enjoining the beneficiary from receiving
payment under the guaranty letter.74 The convention obviously should also have
provisions governing the issuance of such injunctions if it is to effectively unify
the law of guaranty letters.75 Yet, including procedural provisions in international
texts for the unification of law is difficult. Judicial procedures vary widely,
including in some countries the absence of an equivalent of a preliminary injunc-
tion.76 Whatever provision might be adopted, it would introduce new judicial
procedures into some of the legal systems that adopt the convention and those new
procedures would apply to only a limited class of cases. Nevertheless, the Working
Group decided that inclusion of provisions on preliminary injunctions against
payment would "be beneficial for international uniformity and for protection of
the integrity of the guaranty letter," provided that only the bare minimum neces-
sary was included.77
In a first discussion of the standards to be applied in regard to injunctions
against payment, the Working Group decided that "the application of the principal
must manifestly show that the demand was improper." 7  The Working Group
was less certain whether the principal should be permitted to apply for an injunc-
tion prior to demand having been made by the beneficiary, especially since the
72. "Unless other standards are expressly incorporated by reference, sufficiency of compliance
of a presentment is measured by commercial banking standards and practices." Mar. 31, 1993, Draft,
supra note 23, § 5-110(c). Comment 1 explains that "[tihe section adopts the standard of strict
compliance, but strict compliance does not mean slavish conformity to the terms of the letter of
credit."
73. U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/361, I 53, 88. At the nineteenth session the Working Group adopted
the following text for draft article 17(2): "The issuer shall not make payment if it is shown facts that
make the demand manifestly and clearly improper according to article 19." U.N. Doe. A/CN.9/374,
113.
74. U.C.C. § 5-114 (1989).
75. U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/361, 1 103. The conditions under which a preliminary injunction to
payment can be issued because of improper demand affects the security of guaranty letters to beneficiar-
ies in general. The conditions for granting permanent relief against improper demand seem to be of
less importance, once the criteria of what constitutes an improper demand have been agreed upon.
76. Id.; U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/345, 1 58.
77. U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/361, 11 103, 114.
78. Id. 1 104. The Working Group thereby disapproved of the suggested standard of "strong
prima facie evidence," "clear and liquid proof," and "manifestly shown by documentary means,"
the alternatives suggested by the Secretariat in its first draft of art. 21. U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/WG.II/
WP.73/Add.1, supra note 2.
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willingness of courts to grant such anticipatory relief would vary from jurisdiction
to jurisdiction.7 9 On the other hand, if the remedy was to be realistic, the principal
had to have something more than the typically short period of time between the
demand for payment and the payment itself. That issue was closely tied to the
question, which has not yet been decided, whether the issuer would have to give
notice to the principal (or to the instructing party) that demand for payment had
been made.' Members of the Working Group expressed concern that such a
notice requirement might compromise the independence of the guaranty letter.
Furthermore, they observed that the procedure of giving notice was completely
foreign to stand-by letter of credit practice.8
Other issues considered but not yet decided in regard to injunctions are whether
the court should assess the relative harm that would be caused to the parties by
a refusal to grant the injunctive relief; whether there should be a prohibition
against the clause, sometimes included in counter-guarantees, requiring the
counter-guarantor to pay even in the face of a court order prohibiting pay-
ment;8 whether the convention should cover injunctions not based on improper
demand but on other objections to payment such as non-existence, invalidity, or
unenforceability of the guaranty letter; whether it should be possible to enjoin the
beneficiary from accepting payment; and whether the application for a preliminary
injunction should be dealt with in ex parte proceedings, or whether the guarantor,
and perhaps the beneficiary, should be given an opportunity to be heard.8 3 In this
latter connection it has been suggested that a procedure similar to the American
ex parte temporary restraining order followed by a contentious decision on the
issuance of an injunction might be followed. 84
79. U.N. Doc. AICN.9/361, 1 106.
80. U.N. Docs. A/CN.9/345, 11 19-24; A/CN.9/361, 11 24-29; A/CN.9/374, 11 86-92. The
obligation to give notice under article 15 would not be linked to the time available to examine the
claim and decide about payment. In discussion it was said that,
Payment could be made (within the time allowed for examination of the claim) before notice was given (within
the time period provided therefor), and non-compliance with the duty of notification would not affect the validity
or effectiveness of payment but might under certain circumstances lead to a claim for damages.
U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/345, 1 23. The proposed rule was based on URDG art. 17.
81. U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/361, 1 26. In answer it was suggested "that the notice procedure, while
possibly foreign to stand-by letters of credit, might nevertheless usefully be applied to them." Id.
1 27. It has also been said that giving notice to the principal was a common practice in stand-by letters
of credit in some countries. U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/374, 1 89. Contra KWM Int'l v. Chase Manhattan
Bank, N.A., 606 F.2d 10 (2d Cir. 1979), in which the Second Circuit required Chase Manhattan to
give the applicant for the credit three days' notice before making payment on a stand-by letter of
credit.
82. The injunction against payment by the counter-guarantor would presumably be based on the
allegation that the demand for payment by the beneficiary of the indirect guaranty letter was improper,
and that therefore the beneficiary of the counter-guaranty letter should not be reimbursed for its
payment as issuer of the indirect guaranty letter.
83. U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/361, 11 107-110, 115-118.
84. Id. 1110.
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VI. Extend or Pay
It has been suggested that a demand to "extend or pay" could be handled without
a special provision in the convention. One argument was that "extend or pay" is
a subject that could easily be left to contractual regulation, as has already been done
in article 26 of the URDG.8 5 Another argument was that the request for extension
could be considered to be a request for an amendment to the guaranty letter. 86 If the
request for extension was refused either by the issuer orby the principal, the demand
for payment would be examined by the issuer, and payment would be made if the
demand for payment was proper and it met the terms of the guaranty letter.8 7
This approach has not been adopted by the Working Group, at least for the time
being. Some have argued that specific rules would be desirable to regulate the
legal effect and procedures to be followed when an "extend or pay" demand is
made. 88 Two approaches have been suggested for further discussion. The first
would follow the approach taken in article 26 of the URDG. The issuer would
notify the principal of the "extend or pay" demand; no extension would be given
unless agreed to by both the issuer and the principal; if the request for extension
was denied and the demand was proper, the issuer would pay it; the issuer
might defer payment until ten days after original receipt of the "extend or pay"
demand. 89 Under the second approach the demand for payment in an "extend or
pay" demand would not be regarded as a proper demand for payment.9 In order
to achieve the same result as under the first approach, the beneficiary would have
to make the request for extension in sufficient time before the expiration of the
guaranty letter so that, if the request for extension was refused, a proper demand
for payment could later be made before the expiration of the guaranty letter.
The delegation of the United States has resisted the extension of any rule on
"extend or pay" to stand-by letters of credit. In its proposal submitted to the
eighteenth session of the Working Group it said:
There is no law or practice for beneficiary demands or requests that a standby be extended
or be paid other than the law and practice applied to demands for honor and to requests
for amendment. The law should discourage beneficiary "extend or pay" demands on
the issuer that are not provided for in the credit and therefore no provision for them
should be made with regard to standbys. 9'
85. U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/345, 75.
86. U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/361, 1 65.
87. See U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/WG.II/WP.70, 51. As to whether a demand for payment coupled
with a request for extension of the guaranty letter is inherently improper, since either the risk covered
has materialized and no extension is needed or it has not yet materialized and the demand would fall
outside the intended purpose of the guaranty letter, see id. 51-52.
88. U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/361, 1 66.
89. U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/WG.II/WP.76, art. 18, variant A.
90. U.N. Docs. A/CN.9/361, 70; A/CN.9/WG.II/WP.76, art. 18, variant B.
91. U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/WG.U/WP.77, ch. 3, art. 18 cmt.; accord U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/361,
67. The exclusion of stand-bys from any provision on "extend-or-pay" would be in accord with the
UCP, which has no provision on the point in either UCP 400 or UCP 500. However, as noted supra
note 9, the UCP contains no provisions specifically applicable to stand-bys.
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A similar suggestion made at the seventeenth session of the Working Group
to exclude stand-bys from any rule on demands to "extend or pay" was rejected
on the grounds that the demands to "extend or pay" were made under stand-by
letters of credit as well as bank guarantees. 92 However, the matter will be consid-
ered again on several occasions before the final text of the convention is adopted.
VII. Jurisdiction
The tentative decision to include provisions on the power of a court to issue
injunctive-type relief automatically raises the question as to whether the conven-
tion should have provisions on the applicable forum. Such provisions are not
unknown in international conventions on substantive law.93 However, inclusion
of provisions on jurisdiction in substantive law conventions has become politically
more difficult since the 1968 Brussels Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforce-
ment of Judgements in Civil and Commercial Matters has come into force among
the Member States of the European Communities, and the substance of that
convention has been extended to the Member States of the European Free Trade
Area by the 1988 Lugano Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of
Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters. The parties to those conventions
argue that "it would be difficult, if not impossible, for a State that adhered to any
of those conventions to accept different rules and that difficulty might shape
its position on the general question of whether the [convention] should include
jurisdiction provisions at all.'"9 When this matter was discussed in the seventeenth
session of the Working Group some members suggested
that the Commission might wish to consider in a wider context, not limited to the specific
area of guaranty letters, the relationship between universal and regional unification and
discuss the desirability and feasibility of providing a universal framework on jurisdic-
tional matters, building on relevant conventions dealing with such matters for regional
purposes.
95
The suggestion has been overtaken by events in the Hague Conference on Private
International Law where, at the suggestion of the United States, in May 1993
the Conference decided to include in its program of work "the question of the
recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments in civil and commercial mat-
ters. 106
While the Working Group has not yet taken a final decision as to whether a
provision on jurisdiction should be included in the uniform law, 97 it has made
92. U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/361, 67.
93. See, e.g., United Nations Convention on the Carriage of Goods by Sea (1978) (Hamburg
Rules), arts. 21, 22, 17 I.L.M. 603.
94. U.N. Doc. AICN.9/372, 1 123. This is becoming a familiar theme in the UNCITRAL in
regard to both jurisdiction and conflict of laws provisions. See infra text at note 102.
95. Id. 124.
96. Final Act, Hague Conference on Private International Law, B.2.a.
97. U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/361, 1 132.
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some decisions as to what such a provision would contain, if retained. As currently
envisaged, they would do little more than recognize forum selection clauses,
authorize the courts of contracting states to take provisional or protective measures
and provide that, absent a forum selection clause, the courts of the country where
the guaranty letter was issued would have jurisdiction over disputes between the
issuer and the beneficiary and over applications by the principal for a preliminary
order against payment.98
VIII. Applicable Law
The question whether the convention should contain provisions on the applica-
ble law has given rise to the same discussion as took place in regard to jurisdiction.
Some participants argued that it would be inappropriate to include provisions on
the applicable law in a convention that was devoted to substantive law matters.
99
The Member States of the European Communities might find it difficult to be
party to a convention that contained rules on the same subject as the 1980 Rome
Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations.' t° Therefore, the
decision to prepare provisions on the subject remains tentative. 101
The current draft is quite short. If the parties have designated an applicable
law in the guaranty letter or in a separate agreement, or the choice of law is
"demonstrated by the terms and conditions of the guaranty letter," that choice
is to be respected; no limitation is placed on the law that can be chosen, "because
there [is] a practical need to allow parties to choose a law that [bears] no connection
with the transaction, for example, because it [is] perceived as neutral or particu-
larly refined. "'1° The latter argument, which may be relevant in general, would
seem to be misplaced in this context. Any country that adopts the conflict of laws
provisions of the convention will by necessity also have adopted the (neutral and
refined) substantive provisions of the convention.
If the parties have chosen no law, the applicable law would be that of the place
of business of the issuer of the guaranty letter, even if the place of payment was
elsewhere. 0 3 Where the guaranty letter was issued by a branch of the issuer, the
location of the branch would be the determining place. These simple rules, which
are the current rules governing in most jurisdictions, are particularly appropriate
to the relationship between the issuer and the beneficiary. However, the Working
98. See the Secretariat's second draft, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/WG.fl/WP.76/Add.1, at 13.
99. U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/345, 85. Ina somewhat similar context, at the final stage of preparation
of the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Credit Transfers the conflict of laws provision was
deleted from the main text and placed in a footnote to the Model Law "for the use of States that might
wish to adopt it." Report of the U.N. Commission on International Trade Law on the Work of its
Twenty-fifth Session, U.N. GAOR, 47th Sess., 61, U.N. Doc. A/47/17 (1992).
100. U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/345, 1 101.
101. Id. 1 87; U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/361, 134, 139.
102. U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/345, 1 91.
103. U.N. Docs. A/CN.9/WG.II/WP.76/Add.1, at 15; A/CN.9/345, 11 93, 99.
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Group has decided that the obligations of an advising bank should also be governed
by the law of the issuer's place of business.'04 A particular problem arises in the
case of a counter-guaranty, since two independent guaranty letters exist. Under
the proposed conflict of laws rule both guaranty letters would be governed by the
law of the issuer of that letter. The result would be that in most cases the indirect
guaranty letter and the counter-guaranty letter would be governed by the law of
two different states, the same result that obtains today.
IX. Conclusion
The UNCITRAL Convention on Guaranty Letters promises to be of great
importance to the American legal, banking, and business worlds. Stand-by letters
of credit are issued by American banks on the instruction of foreign parties, and
for the benefit of foreign parties. American banks often issue these as counter-
guarantees for guarantees issued by foreign banks at the instance of an American
principal. Differences in the law between these instruments and between countries
in regard to them place issuers, principals, and beneficiaries at risk of inconsistent
treatment of the different parts of a single economic transaction. Although prepa-
ration of the convention is not yet complete, it promises to bring a welcome degree
of order and uniformity to this important area of international economic activity.
104. U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/345, 99.
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